THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE

The Russian or Eastern branch of Slavonic falls into three divisions, Great Russian, Little Russian or Ukrainian, and White Russian. The last, spoken in the former governments of Vitebsk, Minsk and Mohilev, has only claimed to be a written language since the Revolution: it is very close to Great Russian save for certain points in which it makes a transition to Polish, its Western neighbour, South Great Russian and Ukrainish. The other two branches have always called themselves simply "Russian", the Great Russians calling the South-Western language "Little Russian", which was resented by its speakers. These latter, unable in practice to establish their claim to be called "Russians", have adopted the words "Ukraina" and "Ukrainian" from the part of their country most distinguished in history (v. p. 64). The name "Ruthenian" is simply a foreigner's mishandling of *Rusin* = "one Russian man". It is applied mostly to the Western Ukrainians, but in older usage (e.g. in Latin books) to any Russian.

The Ukrainians claim that their language is the true representative of the speech current in Kievan Russia before the Mongol invasion: it has certainly kept certain points, e.g. the use of the vocative case and the distinction between *e* and *ye*, now lost in Great Russian: on the other hand it has changed original *g* into *h* (which does not exist in Great Russian), *o* in certain cases into *i*, *ê* into *i*, "hard *l*" often into *v* or *w*, etc., and has borrowed many words from Polish and even from German.

The Ukrainian language varies greatly in different parts of its wide area, the speech of the Kiev region and, curiously enough, the archaic dialects of "Carpathian Rus" differing less from Great Russian than does that of Galicia. The train of circumstances by which Galician became the foundation of the modern literary language is set forth in Chapter v (pp. 247 sqq.).

The shaded band on Map I shows the extreme limits of Ukrainian speech, but the borders are very vague and within them much Great Russian is spoken: along the sea in "New Russia" and to the East Great Russian is really dominant. In the extreme West the towns mostly speak Polish and the countryside Ukrainian.

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p. XI

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

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XVI (A)

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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XVI (B)

4. Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

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

xvi (D)

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XVI (E)

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XVI (F)

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XVI (G)

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4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDI Ukraine RDI



XVI (H)

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The predominance of the non-Ukrainian elements in the organs of administration and in educational institutions is of course explained by the fact that the Ukrainian people remained overwhelmingly peasant, and there had been in the nineteenth century, and even earlier, a large and heterogeneous alien element in the towns. Nevertheless Kaganovich, in his speech to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in 1927, was at pains to demonstrate the success of 'ukrainization'. 'Among us', he said with that graceful Jewish facility for identifying himself with the people among whom he had come, 'our Ukrainian culture has developed on a grand scale. Ukrainian culture has made such progress in all branches in these last years that even the most eager Ukrainian nationalists never dreamed of such rapid development. In primary schools Ukrainians are taught by Ukrainians in the Ukrainian language. The high schools are gradually becoming completely "ukrainized"; Ukrainian books and press are at present developing to an extent unknown in all the history of the Ukraine. In our Council of People's Commissars, which is the supreme administrative organ of our government, 13 out of 20 members are Ukrainian. In our Party's Executive Committee, 66 per cent are Ukrainians, 25 per cent are Russians, 14 per cent are Jews.'

Kaganovich's emphasis on the predominance of Ukrainians on the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party is, of course, meaningless, since in the Soviet hierarchy all power is vested in the Secretaries of the various regional and local Committees of the Communist Party, who are themselves responsible not to the members of the Committees but to the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. Stalin filled this latter position, and Kaganovich himself was his nominee sent from Moscow with complete power over the regional and local Committees in the Ukraine. Kaganovich's successor, 'the dictator' Postyshev, who only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was another importation from Moscow—as is Khrushchov, who is at present (1939) governing the Ukraine.

While Kaganovich was praising 'the achievements of "ukrainization"' he was already considering means of putting some limit on these achievements. In this same year when he made his genial speech before the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party under his influence issued a decree making Russian the second official language in the Ukraine. The First Five Year Plan was then beginning, and one of the most important features of this Plan was the wide development of industry in the Ukraine. The coal and metallurgical industries

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDI Ukraine RDI

were to be modernized, and the construction of the great power station of Dnieprostroy was in view. Thousands of engineers, technicians and specialized workers were being sent into the Ukraine and these people not only had no knowledge of the Ukrainian dialect but they found that dialect most inappropriate for correspondence between different Government departments on complicated technical questions. The intensified industrialization of the Ukraine was obviously destined to strengthen greatly all connections with the north and linguistic differences gave promise of frequent and annoying difficulties. Very soon the Ukrainian language came only to be used in the sphere of 'cultural relations'.

Meanwhile Kaganovich, in surveying the various aspects of 'ukrainization', began gradually to investigate the part played in different branches of the administration by 'Ukrainian nationalists' or those suspected of being such.

§7. 'THE REVOLUTION AGAINST THE PEASANTS': REPRESSION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

In 1929 the Communist Revolution was approaching its second and decisive stage: Marxist principles which had conquered the life of the cities were to be imposed on the countryside. But the process of 'collectivizing' agriculture was to prove even more difficult in the Ukraine than it was in the provinces of Great Russia. Individual property in land had always been traditional in the Ukraine, and the background of the social history of the country had been the unending struggle of the peasantry to maintain their right to own the land they worked—against Polish landlords and Cossack and, later, Great Russian landlords. The strength of the Ukrainian peasantry had always been their stubborn determination that each should own his plot of land, and their weakness had been a love of individual freedom degenerating often enough into libertarian anarchy.

The outlook of the Ukrainian peasant differed widely from that of the Great Russian. The *obshchina*—the old Russian form of possessing (but not of working) land collectively—was unknown in the regions of Chernigov and Poltava and in all right-bank Ukraine. The creation of *kolkhozy* (collective farms) was from the beginning opposed, generally passively and sometimes actively, by the peasantry. And Kaganovich hastened, so soon as peasant opposition developed, to deprive the Ukrainians of the weapon which the national idea might provide. (In Caucasia and Turkestan, during the same period, opposition to collectivization was combined with a renascence and strengthening of local nationalist movements directed

CHAPTER FIVE

Ukrainization

The period of the New Economic Policy was likewise the time when the movement for the Ukrainization of the state reached its highest point. This was a complicated political, cultural and scholarly movement which aimed to develop the Ukrainian self-consciousness in every possible way and to establish the proper role of the Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It took many and diverse forms, and while it developed into a definite opposition to Russian influence and Russian methods, it was not primarily so much an anti-Communist as an extra-Communist movement, even though most of its outstanding leaders were tried and tested members of the party.

The basis for the entire movement is to be found in the slight attraction that Communism as a doctrine possessed for the Ukrainian people. As late as 1927 there were only 122,928 Ukrainian Communists, that is, about thirty-nine for each ten thousand of the Ukrainian population. The bulk of the Communists in Ukraine were Russian and the vast majority of these belonged to the urban proletariat or to the workers in the Donets Basin and Kryvy Rih.

The general period of disintegration during the civil war and the period of Militant Communism had greatly strengthened the power and self-confidence of the peasants and had weakened the power of the city workmen. This showed Lenin and the dominant group that some method had to be found to win at least the passive support of the countryside if new troubles were to be averted.

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the tenacity with which the Ukrainian peasants, whether they were literate or illiterate, clung to their native language. Lenin had used this characteristic with

skill and success in encouraging the Ukrainian opposition to the Russian Provisional Government. The proper recognition of the language had been one of the most insistent demands put forward by all groups which had later come together in the Ukrainian National Republic. The failure of the Bolsheviks in their early occupation of Ukraine to recognize the Ukrainian language had been one of the surest means of arousing opposition to their course and this time with their power established, the Bolsheviks decided to change their policy. As early as December 6, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party had declared: "In carrying out absolutely the principle of the self-determination of peoples, the Central Committee considers it necessary to repeat again that the Russian Communist Party maintains the recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic." It encouraged the Russians in Ukraine to learn Ukrainian and to aid in developing this as a weapon for the Communist education of the laboring masses.

Yet all was mere verbiage and even Vynnychenko who, at this moment, was sympathetic to the Bolsheviks in his "Letter to the Ukrainian Workmen and Peasants," published in *Forward* (Lviv, 30.10. 2-3, II, 1920), lamented the fact that, despite this, the Ukrainian language did not receive its just due and that many Russian Communists were inclined to look upon even Ukrainian Communists as potential counter-revolutionists.

On the other hand, there was one group of Communists who were sincerely devoted to this goal. They were the former Borotbisty and the Ukapisty who had stressed the need for Ukrainian Communism and who had never lost an opportunity, while stressing their Communist feelings, to express the hope that the Ukrainian Communists might some time be formed into a special party and be duly admitted to the Communist International on a par with all the other Communist parties of the world. They took advantage of the situation offered by the formation of the Union of Soviet Republics and eagerly sought posts in the Commissariat of Education, which was one of the independent republic commissariats. This gave them a very good opportunity to work for the develop-

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

ment of Ukrainian and Ukrainian culture in a field where there could be little expressed opposition. 186 191 665

On the other hand, every step for the fostering of Ukrainian or its development was met by the Russian Communists, and especially by those in Ukraine, with the greatest hostility. This went so far that Dmytro Lebid, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the KP/b/U, declared that there was a conflict of two languages and cultures in Ukraine and that it was not the duty of the Communist Party to interfere in this but to allow the dominant culture to win. In this he was actuated as a Russianized Ukrainian by his hostility to his native language and culture but he failed to win support, for it was very obvious that his policy of favoring Russian was only deepening the gulf between the Party and the Ukrainian peasants, the thing that the Moscow authorities were endeavoring at the time to bridge.

On August 1, 1923, the Communist Party passed a new decree which said: "The government of the workers and peasants regards it as necessary in the immediate future to concentrate its power on the spreading of a knowledge of the Ukrainian language. The former equality existing hitherto between the two most widely used languages in Ukraine, Ukrainian and Russian, is insufficient. Life, as experience has shown, causes the actual superiority of Russian. To remove this inequality, the government of the workmen and peasants will introduce a series of practical means which, respecting the equality of the languages of all nationalities on Ukrainian territory, must assure to the Ukrainian language that place which corresponds to the number and economic importance of the Ukrainian people in the territory of the UkSSR."

It further provided that Russian officials in Ukraine should learn Ukrainian within a definite period. All this sounded well on paper but the date by which Russian officials had either to learn Ukrainian or be recalled was constantly postponed further into the future, and the highest men who came for but short periods and who represented Moscow in the Ukrainian capital stubbornly refused to make any effort to obey these decrees.

On the other hand, every declaration to this effect was eagerly

Ukraine Under the Soviets

186 snapped up by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty in the Commis-
191 sariat for Education. In a short time they worked so effectively
665 that nearly all the books published in Ukraine and about 85% of the newspapers were put out in Ukrainian. The circulation of these Ukrainian publications in the villages increased rapidly and aided in producing a sense of relief among the peasants and a tolerance of the situation which was in sharp contrast to the prevailing mood of a few years before.

[871] A network of Ukrainian schools was set up throughout the country with instruction in the native language and the number of students grew rapidly from among the peasant classes. It had been centuries since the Ukrainian language had reached such a state of popularity. The theatres produced plays in Ukrainian as the chief part of their repertory. The cities assumed a markedly Ukrainian appearance and the leaders could look with satisfaction on their results.

871 The one difficulty was the low level of the instruction in many
186 places but this was equally characteristic of the Russian terrain. The revolution and the Bolshevik laws had abolished the old Russian system of education and had eliminated from the schools the bulk of the older intelligentsia and their children who, on one excuse or another, were excluded from all opportunities for study. The old disciplines were abolished and the Soviet school entered upon a chaotic period. Nevertheless, the changes which the former Borotbist Hrynko introduced, including the establishment of seven year schools which gave the students the right to enter upon a three year course in various technical schools, served to increase rapidly the number of young and partly trained Ukrainians who were available for posts in the government service and who thereby freed the organization from its dependence upon Russian-trained people.

645 In 1925, he was succeeded in the post of Commissar by O.
871 Shumsky, likewise a Borotbist, who had held the post of Ukrainian
186 Minister in Warsaw. He had come back in 1923 to become the
665 Director of Agitation and Propaganda for the Central Committee of the KP/b/U. An ardent believer in the Ukrainian cause, he

1 [1923 -- Analyst]

2 [Hrynko, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

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661 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in
558 Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

[665] The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

[814] Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

•191 Postyshev's object was the rerussification of the country, for it
626 had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian news-
[871] papers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1 [1933 -- Analyst]
122

basis with Ukrainian. He established Russian theatres in the larger cities and sent them Russian companies from Leningrad and Moscow to show the greatness of Russian art, while at the same time he had Les Kurbas arrested at the end of the year and closed the Berezil Theatre, the leading company in Ukraine, and even abolished its name as Catherine the Great had abolished the name of the Zaporozhian Sich one hundred fifty years before.

The fundamental object was to re-Russianize Ukraine as rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this idea, Zatonsky even suggested that the students should be encouraged to talk a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian in the hope that they could thus be more quickly induced to accept the alien tongue. That was a rash thought, for as soon as it was reported to Moscow, there came a strong protest from Gorky that such a procedure could only injure the purity of the Russian language by mixing foreign elements in it. Zatonsky hurriedly withdrew his suggestions but it was too late and only a few years later he was to pay the penalty for his rash proposal.

It was small wonder that Khvylovy, who knew well that he was threatened with arrest and execution, committed suicide in despair on May 13, 1933 and he was followed on July 6, by Skrypnyk who was too familiar with the workings of Russian Communism not to realize that he would be steadily demoted until he could be finished off without comment as a fallen idol.

The terror and the destruction proceeded apace and after the murder of Kirov in Leningrad on December 21, 1934, new investigations were ordered and it was discovered that the bulk of the Ukrainian authors were involved in the conspiracy. In a very short time their ranks were almost completely decimated. In the same month H. Kosynka, O. Vlyzko, I. Krushelnytsky, K. Burevy, and D. Falkivsky were shot on various pretenses. Nearly all the former members of the *Vaplite,* the Neo-Classicists, the groups connected with the MARS in Kiev and the *New Generation,* were liquidated in one way or another, either by execution or deportation and deportation was practically the equivalent of death, for scarcely one of the deported ever returned to the Ukraine or made

[reference to forced Russification of Ukraine, 193? - Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

626 814 191

In the field of studies in the Ukrainian language, under the leadership of A. Khvylya who had already distinguished himself by his attacks on the entire process of Ukrainization, new steps were taken to counteract all that had been gained by any school of thought.

In the beginning Naum Kaganovich had tried to show that the scholars of the preceding period had worked under the influence of "populist" theories of language. He was soon forced to change this to a statement that the work had been "bourgeois nationalist," the favorite slogan for anything that was not Russian. In his article, *The Language Theory of Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism,* he wrote: "Here under the conception of the people emerge the kurkul circles; the bourgeois nationalists have shaped the development of the Ukrainian language on the speech of the kurkuls." In another passage he declared: "By this approach to the people the bourgeois nationalists understand the removal from the language of everything that is connected with the October revolution, the removal of all features which bring it closer to the language of the Russian proletariat and the workers of the other republics of the USSR and the implanting of everything that is outmoded, conservative and permeated with the nationalist bourgeois spirit."

It was easy to see at what these new "scholars" were aiming. The old arguments as to whether the local dialects of the peasants or the newer literary language which had been developed for over a century was the better Ukrainian were now replaced by the definite statement that the proper form was that which was the language of the more "advanced" classes, i.e. the Communists and their sympathizers, who were the least connected with any special area and were the least affected by any considerations of locality or traditional culture or usage. Even during Ukrainization the Communists of high rank coming from Moscow had been officially relieved of the task of learning Ukrainian. Now this was expanded and those who, of their own volition, learned a few words were adjudged the best authorities on Ukrainian because of their Communist knowledge and standing.

The new authorities set themselves the task of rooting out those

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

attempts which the "bourgeois nationalists" had made to bring together the Ukrainians of the east and of the west. They declared that the preceding group had sought to bring back capitalism and to separate Ukrainian from the "brotherly" Russian and to remodel it on Polish and German standards. They attacked any system of orthography and transliteration which differed from that used in Russian and in their attacks on Polonisms in Ukrainian they went so far as to call Polish any Ukrainian form which differed from the Russian, even when the Polish word in fact had the same form as the Russian and differed from the Ukrainian.

In the small dictionaries that were printed only those words were admitted that revealed Russian relations and the academician Krymsky once remarked of one of these that it was merely a Russian-Russian dictionary, so far had the process been carried.

In 1933 Khvylya published a new orthography for Ukrainian. This repudiated the work that had been done earlier to bring together Eastern and Western Ukrainian and sought to take as the standard those Ukrainian dialects that had been most thoroughly russianized, although at the same time he carefully avoided explaining the policy on which he was working.

Thus, during these years there developed a definite policy of disintegrating the language from within. It was based very definitely upon the old theories of the nineteenth century, that Ukrainian was merely a corrupt form of Russian and could not have any independent development, but such a statement which would have satisfied Nicholas I and Belinsky was not expressed clearly. It was enveloped in a mass of Communist jargon which appealed to the great names of Bolshevik ideology and covered a complete ignorance of any of the facts of language or of popular usage.

At the same time in another field Postyshev saw the opportunity to deliver further blows under the guise of progress and of satisfying Ukrainian aspirations. He moved the capital of the Ukrainian Republic back to Kiev from Kharkiv.[1] There were good reasons for this. The Soviet regime had been established at Kharkiv, because it was nearer to the Russian boundary and hence could more easily receive support from Russian military sources during the

[1] [1933 -- Analyst]

simply Russians was constantly increased. It was almost forbidden 626
to mention the name Ukrainian in connection with the older settlers 186
in Kuban, along the Don, in the Green Wedge along the Amur, etc. [191]
and it was a matter of perplexity as to what language they could be said to speak or what dialect in connection with later studies of the dialects of the Russian language. It was inadmissible to regard them as speaking a peasant dialect in view of the attitude of the authorities in recognizing some sort of Ukrainian, but it was even worse to believe that Ukrainian could exist in those regions and so they were simply passed over and forgotten, while the newcomers, usually being under some kind of a ban, were simply treated as Russian deportees.

Even this was not the whole story, for in such cities as Vinnytsya 661
during these same years the population was slaughtered by the thousands and buried secretly in carefully hidden burial places which were then turned into parks and playgrounds to conceal the extent of the crimes. This was repeated in many places but the situation in Vinnytsya attracted especial attention because during the War, the Germans found the places of burial and revealed the thousands of bodies of the victims, many of whom had been buried alive. The extent of these massacres was as great as was the killing of the Polish officers in Katyn, which was likewise brought to light during the war.

By the time the census of 1939 was taken and this was the last 162
one published, the growth of the number of Russians and the diminution of Ukrainians showed clearly that there was a large scale transfer of nationality which completely reversed the figures in some sections of Asia without regard for the natural laws of reproduction and mortality.

In this atmosphere the nature of the intellectual and literary 626
work in the UkSSR can well be imagined. The Ukrainian scholars 814
were forced to accept the full Russian theories of the Ukrainian 661
past. This led to a complete revaluation of all the "outstanding figures." In 1933 the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was condemned on the ground that he was a typical representative of the noble classes. By the outbreak of World War II he became a Rus-

1 [1936-1938 -- Analyst]

626 sian patriot for signing the Treaty of Pereyaslav and bringing the
814 Zaporozhian Kozaks under Muscovite domination. It was so in
661 every branch of historical study. In back of the conception of the Soviet man and Soviet patriotism began to emerge with ever greater clarity the conception of Russian patriotism, as the doctrine of the "elder brother" who had given culture and civilization to the other nations of the Soviet Union became clearer and clearer.

626 It was the same thing in language. Khvylya and his friends
814 had been working on a Ukrainian-Russian dictionary but this was
● 191 immediately criticized by *Pravda* for its divisive tendencies, and the guilty compilers were liquidated. A new edition was started in 1938 on still a new principle. The Ukrainian and Russian words were to have the same number of synonyms and these were to have identical value. If, in any particular case, this did not prove to be true, it was so much the worse for the Ukrainian. If there were more words in Ukrainian to express various shades of one idea that there were in Russian, the words were banned. If there were fewer, the Russian words were supplied in order to show the influence that Russian had had upon the cultural development of Ukrainian.

The result was the reverse of what Zatonsky had proposed. He had suggested a mixed language with the idea that the Ukrainians would develop by practice toward the use of standard Russian. Now the new Commissariat of Education was introducing Russian into Ukrainian, forbidding the use of Ukrainian syntactical constructions which had no parallel in Russian in order to train the Ukrainians to speak Russian by infiltrating it into their native speech. The result would have been perhaps the same, but the important difference was that it preserved the supremacy of the Russian language in a pure form and corrupted the Ukrainian beyond recognition.

538 This procedure was too violent, even for many of the poets
191 and writers who were most ardent in their support of the Stalinist
626 regime. Men like Bazhan, who had put his pen entirely at the disposal of Moscow, continued to use some of the forbidden words and even obtained rewards for their obsequious phrases couched in

this taboo language. It was necessary if the whole theory of the USSR was not to fall by the wayside and the authorities in Moscow were becoming aware of the growing danger of Nazism.

They encouraged the writers, as Tychyna and Rylsky, to write narrative and other poems on themes of the old hostility of the Ukrainians to the Polish nobles and to stress the assistance which, in those ancient days, the Ukrainians had received from the Muscovite authorities. They fanned again the fires of the civil war when the Ukrainian Communists, backed by their Muscovite friends and masters, were warring against the Ukrainian National Republic and Petlyura.

In fact, during these fantastic years, Tychyna, Rylsky, Yanovsky and similar writers, as well as Korniychuk, found it easier to maintain their freedom by this fanning of Ukrainian chauvinism into flame than did those authors who, following the narrow interpretation of socialist realism, sought to trace the transformations in the contemporary life and the growth of confidence in the Russian ideas of industrialization and collectivization. Again and again these men were called to account for allowing their local and national sympathies to run away with them and to include descriptions which were perhaps nostalgic but which could be twisted in the perverse logic of the NKVD into hidden criticisms of the great Stalin, the leaders of the people, and the all-wise and beneficent rule of Moscow.

By 1939, the situation in the Ukraine had changed entirely from what it had been in 1929 when the first five year plan was getting under way. The salient features of the Ukrainian economic life had been destroyed. Yet Moscow was not yet satisfied.

Despite the increased taxation and the reduction in the income of the average dweller on a collective farm, the Communist Party demanded each year a larger part of the grain and of the cash income. The voluntary donations for the benefit of the armed forces were increased and steps were begun to demand taxes in kind from the returns which the peasants received from their individual plots. Thus a peasant was required to contribute so many eggs per year to the government, which did not concern itself as to

436 the more favored because the Soviets equated in value the Polish zloty and the Soviet karbovanets. When we take into consideration the fact that prior to the war a pound of meat in Poland cost four zloty and in the UkSSR twenty-five to thirty karbovantsy, the vast purchasing power of the Soviet officials can be seen. Then in December, to ruin the native population, they arbitrarily stopped the zloty as legal tender, so that the Ukrainian population lost everything, except those fortunate persons who had succeeded in exchanging their Polish money for German marks by clandestine trade across the border.

191 This swarm of officials was of various kinds. Those who were attached to fields like military affairs, the railroads, the posts and telegraphs, etc., i.e. those branches which were directly under the All-Union Commissariats, made no concealment of the fact that Russian was from now on to be the chief language. Other sections which were under the Commissariats in Kiev first adopted Ukrainian as their official tongue, but by the middle of 1940 they, too, had passed over to the use of Russian, exactly as had been done in all the offices in Kiev.

661 471 By the end of November, when the supplies in the stores were already becoming exhausted, the actual work of nationalization commenced. The former owners were often thrown out, if their establishments had been of any size, and as former wealthy individuals they were refused food tickets and other privileges on the ground that they belonged to the non-laboring element and were enemies of the people. This meant that they were compelled to sell upon the black market everything that they had been able to save or which they possessed and which had not been confiscated, and during the winter many of them, like the Polish landlowners and the police who fell into Communist hands, were deported under atrocious and inhuman conditions to Kazakhstan and Central Asia to disappear.

[665] On the other hand, the Soviets introduced at once the idea of dining halls for the workers and special stores for Communists and higher functionaries where they could secure easily and cheaply whatever there was to be obtained in Western Ukraine.

[1939--Analyst]

The Soviet Cultural Policy in the Ukraine After the War

The situation is even more severe in the field of language. 191 626 538

Korniychuk after World War II emphasized that Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism was not to be sought only by a consideration of the contents of books and paintings. It was reflected in a still more dangerous form in the language of the books themselves. Any author who showed a predilection for the use of the older forms of the language or sought to develop it in any way other than the Communist Party desired was thereby convicting himself of holding nationalistic sentiments and of being dangerously reactionary. He thus accused of bourgeois nationalism even those writers as Yanovsky who had been most rigorous in following the party line in content.

The real significance of this statement of Korniychuk's is shown by the *Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary* which finally appeared in 1948 under the editorship of L. A. Bulakhovsky and M. F. Rylsky. The work was published in Moscow, although it bore the stamp of the Institute of Language Study of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR. 191 626 814

In this the authors made no concealment of their program, for they definitely stated that their work was based upon the "spoken" Ukrainian of the government offices (where it was the most corrupted by Russian words), and not the older Ukrainian language as spoken before the introduction of the Bolshevik reforms. They added, too, that they had supplied from Russian whatever was lacking in Ukrainian, for "thanks to the Russian language, the Ukrainian has been able to acquire the capacity to respond to the needs of socialist construction and to satisfy the cultural needs of the Ukrainian people." [198]

Stripped of its Communist jargon, this passage merely means that the Moscow authorities have decided to carry on their policy of russification in a new way. They have recognized the gap between the older Ukrainian language and the hodgepodge which they have produced and they are now insisting on using the words of the older usage in their most narrow and restricted sense, and by refusing to recognize any possibility of development in Ukrainian or any changes in it, they are forcing Ukrainian to become a dead language and by an inverted purism are planning to compel

191 the Ukrainians to recognize that Russian and Russian alone is in
626 a position to grow and develop.
814 This is entirely in line with the new philological policy dictated by Stalin after his repudiation of the late Prof. Marr and what was commonly known as Marrism, a theory that Stalin had sponsored for many years. Now he was willing to argue that Russian as the language of the USSR was not only the Russian language as the language of the Russian people but it was also in a new sense a zonal language, the approved language of Socialism and Communism and, as such, it had already absorbed all that it needed and its mission was to replace all those languages which were spoken by people who had awaked to the truth of the Moscow doctrines.

626 Thus the new theories of language study that were officially
814 accepted in Moscow opened new vistas for cultural oppression and perversion of the Ukrainian masses. They were a signal for renewed efforts, not only to control the Ukrainian cultural life in the present and the future but their efforts were extended to the past and the scholars were set to carry out an artificial restatement of Ukrainian history, literature and culture from the earliest known periods.

538 It is small wonder then that the modern post-war Ukrainian
626 literature is becoming more and more a pallid and bloodless imitation of the stereotyped patterns required for Great Russian and that even those authors who have sold themselves to the Stalinist regime are unable to produce anything of real value or of even mediocre excellence. They are turning out the average propaganda material against the imperialistic Americans on the lines ordered by the Politiburo with never a thought except the income and perquisites which they are slated to receive and the constant terror lest at some moment by an unfortunate slip they may be accused justly or unjustly of that terrible crime of bourgeois nationalism and lose in an instant all that they have worked for years to win.

The cultural pressure exerted on eastern Ukraine is spread likewise with even more force over those portions in the West which had been formerly under Poland or Czechoslovakia. Here, as former parts of the old Hapsburg monarchy, the writers had had

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of the determined efforts of Erich Koch and his cohorts to bring every aspect of life under their control, the sheer extent of the Ukraine and the size of its population prevented complete success. For example, in the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev, there were only five hundred Germans on the administrative staff, charged with governing a population of 1,920,000, in an area of nearly seventeen thousand square miles.[3]

The limitations on control arising from the small number of German personnel available were made yet narrower by the language barrier. The extent to which the Wehrmacht was dependent on nationalists as interpreters has already been described. Since few Reichskommissariat officials knew the Slavic languages and yet in general rejected the use of émigrés or West Ukrainians as aides, they were thrown back on local interpreters and assistants as intermediaries between themselves and the masses. Supposedly reliable persons, often ethnic Germans, were employed. These physical limitations, however, compelled the German officials to concentrate on keeping the "commanding heights" of the administration—economic controls, armed force, and means of communication—in their hands, while turning over most other aspects of public affairs to administrators drawn from the native population. In these fields they could lay down policy and occasionally intervene brutally to punish real or fancied violations of their directives. They could play one group against another and thereby secure a check on the development of movements threatening to pass from German control. They could place all aspects of life under a crushing weight of fear and material deprivation. Lacking a body of supporters extending down to the smallest units of society, however, they could not enforce a positive program of indoctrination and—except in an intermittent and incomplete fashion—they could not prevent those who were in contact with the masses of the population from imparting their own ideological tinge to their activities.

The physical limitations of German power meant that the local administrative machinery in the East Ukraine was to a large extent left to the inhabitants. Local men were of course especially predominant in the administration of rural areas, but

[3] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, December 2, 1942, p. 1; *Volyn'*, February 25, 1943, p. 4.

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for reasons which will be discussed in the next chapter, little is known about their activities in connection with nationalism. The city administrations were more closely supervised by the Germans, but their size prevented them from being completely controlled. In spite of the fact that the populace soon realized that only the shadow of power was permitted the local administrations, the concept of the omnipotence of state control was so well established that even the outer signs of authority behind the nationalist cause were of some importance in winning support for it. Throughout the occupied Ukraine, except for the Donbas, which was very mixed ethnically, the languages of administration were German and Ukrainian only. Although it is said that the officials who carried on the governmental work in the prescribed language frequently spoke Russian as soon as they had left their desks, and sometimes even wrote their reports and orders in that language,[4] having them translated into Ukrainian, the prestige value of the change was considerable. The same was true of the widespread use of national symbols, which had been forbidden under Soviet rule, such as the trident and the blue and yellow colors; they appeared on the uniforms of the police, as banners decorating the administrative buildings, even on the streetcars. On the other hand, the removal of these symbols, when Russophile elements were introduced into the administration to replace the nationalists, was equally important as a negative token of loss of prestige; the official language, however, always remained Ukrainian.[5]

Some indication of the influence exerted upon the overt attitudes of the inhabitants of the East Ukraine by the apparent ascendancy of Ukrainian nationalism is furnished by nationalities statistics obtained from censuses taken by various city administrations in late 1941 and early 1942,[6] since each citizen was usually

[4] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3.

[5] When the *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* group was arrested, the cultural department of the Kiev city administration was ordered to remove all tridents and Ukrainian flags; see Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 11. In Dniepropetrovsk, the Germans followed up the destruction of the Ukrainian *oblast* administration by removing the trident from the masthead of *Vil'na Ukraïna* (The Free Ukraine), the city's newspaper, and changing its name to *Dniepropetrovs'ka Hazeta* (Interview 77).

[6] See Appendix.

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that number of inhabitants, had 541 students in its medical school.[37] Medical institutes were also reopened in Stalino, Dniepropetrovsk, and Vinnitsa, and perhaps in other cities, although it is doubtful if any of these were the centers of nationalist youth organization which the faculty in Kiev became under the leadership of the OUN-M.[38]

The educational structure described in the preceding paragraph was designed for adolescents or young adults, and thus could be used for direct propagation of nationalist concepts. It was, of course, partly for this reason that the Germans confined advanced training within such narrow limits. Even these restrictions were not the end of the difficulties faced in inculcating a nationalist type of education in those about to assume the role of citizens, for the technical schools were frequently emptied of their students and faculty to meet the demands of the *Ostarbeiter* recruiters. The elementary schools were also drained of teachers by the *Ostarbeiter* program, and the pupils, though too young for forced labor, were decimated by famine and plague. If the task of building national consciousness had to be viewed as a long-term one, then the four-year elementary school offered a considerable field for cultivation.[39]

The problem confronting the nationalist leaders in education was twofold: they had to ensure a basis for the development of an independent Ukraine by making certain that all instruction was in the Ukrainian language, so that the rising generation would be fully at home in this speech; and they had to replace the Communist ideology by a positive nationalist concept. The first task was relatively uncomplicated, though far from easy in practice. In line with their policy of encouraging the purely nonpolitical aspects of Ukrainian nationality, the Germans ordered all instruction to be in Ukrainian. The nationalist directors enthusiastically supported this rule, but it was sometimes difficult to enforce it, since even teachers who were themselves nationalist in sentiment were not always able to conduct classes in Ukrainian.[40]

[37] Occ E-4 (1); *Ukraïns'ka Diiisnist'*, October 10, 1942, p. 1.

[38] See Chapter V.

[39] In Kiev alone there were fifty elementary schools with 17,000 students (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2).

[40] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 4; M. Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki*

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in greater detail. It is absolutely essential to stress the key nature of this problem, however, for it is almost beyond doubt that any movement which had offered a fully satisfactory solution to the agrarian problem would have won the adherence of the mass of the peasantry, regardless of its stand on the national question.

Superficially, the situation in the countryside was satisfactory from the nationalist standpoint. It is true that certain peasant traits of a distinctively national character had been subjected to erosion by the developments of the Soviet period. The handicrafts, including making of the national costume, had almost vanished under the joint impact of material shortages and growing availability of factory products.[33] The physical appearance of the villages had been altered too and much of their distinctiveness lost through the Soviet destruction of the cemeteries.[34]

In the more basic matter of language, the changes had not been so great, although in some areas at least many "town words" in the "all-Soviet" (i.e., Russian) tongue had been introduced.[35] From the point of view of developing replenishments for the intellectual elite from peasant stock, the situation was worse, however, for the Ukrainian tongue was frequently scorned as the speech of "Ivany i Maryny z kolhospu"—"Johns and Marys off the farm."[36] Even more significant, the mere fact that the peasants spoke Ukrainian, and even had a certain affection for the language as their mother tongue, did not necessarily prove that they possessed any consciousness of nationality. A Ukrainian visitor to one of the villages in the Taganrog district of the lower Don, just beyond the border of the Ukrainian SSR, reported that all the inhabitants spoke pure Ukrainian and retained Ukrainian customs. When addressed as Ukrainians, however, they denied the appellation, insisting that the "Ukrainians" lived over to the west, across the border. The nationalist reporter pointed out the identity of speech and manners with the population to the west, but they replied, "Yes, they are our brothers," yet persisted in denying that they were themselves Ukrainian.[37]

[33] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 26, 1942, p. 3.
[34] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 15, 1942, p. 4.
[35] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1942, p. 3.
[36] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3.
[37] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 22, 1942, p. 2.

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impression on the intellectuals of the smaller towns. OUN-M writers and propagandists appear to have maintained regular contact with them for several months in 1941, and it is apparent that the Kiev *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* served as a model for many of the new editors.[8] Schools were opened under the direction of nationalist educators, Prosvita and theatrical groups were formed, cooperatives linked with *Vukospilka* were active. Apparently, too, the town administrations were largely in Ukrainian hands; the municipal authorities in Uman' issued a sweeping order forbidding the use of the Russian language in any office, school, or enterprise under their jurisdiction.[9]

The influence of the nationalists in the towns penetrated to some degree to the countryside in the area west of the Dnieper. For example, nationalist papers like *Nova Doba*, published in Berdichev, seem to have had a moderately large circulation in the villages. There also seem to have been nationalist influences of a purely local character in some places, aside from those brought in by the nationalist parties. Zvenigorodka, a small town about a hundred miles due south of Kiev had been the home of the Free Cossacks, a nationalist organization of the wealthier peasants during the revolutionary period. The group was revived by some of the villagers under the German occupation, and, together with a mimeographed newspaper, served as a focal point for local nationalism.[10]

The influence of the church, especially in the rural areas, was not entirely on the side of Ukrainian nationalism.[1] The Autonomous clergy under Alexius made an early start in reorganizing religious life in this region. They established a diocese of Vinnitsa and Zhitomir, and during most of the period of occupation were supported by the influential Bishop Damaskin (Maliuti) of Kamenets-Podolsk. Damaskin's diocese included nearly five hundred churches, with a hundred and sixty priests.[11] Apparently most of this large organization, which was overwhelmingly concentrated in the rural districts, had no objection to Damaskin's allegiance to the Russophile church. The Autocephalous Church

[8] Interview 30.
[9] *Nastup*, May 3, 1942, p. 2.
[10] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[11] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 13, 1942, p. 2.

[1] [After Germans had occupied this territory--Analyst]

The Minister of the Reich at Kiev, Muhm, a subtler man, expressed himself differently though in the same sense: 'I am convinced that it is necessary to maintain the fiction of a friendly independent country in the Ukraine. . . . We shall completely destroy the little authority which remains with the Ukrainian Government if we were to show too coarsely that it is only a toy in our hands.'

Disarmed, enslaved by the great force of the army of the central empires, the Ukraine[1] was not in the position of an independent State. The Ukrainian language, imported from Galicia, was not spoken in the country. Only official documents and administrative notices were written in Ukrainian. Not a single private business ever used this language either for correspondence or advertising. In the schools and universities Russian continued to be used. The circulation of newspapers in the Ukrainian language was very small, while the Russian papers which agreed not to carry on open propaganda against the troops of occupation appeared everywhere and were actually the only ones read by the population.

The Ukrainian Government, composed of politicians having absolutely no administrative experience, soon proved to be incapable of organizing the supply of grain as promised to the armies of the central empires. The Germans then decided to change the regime. The organizations of landowners, small and big, which supplied corn and other agricultural produce to the forces of occupation, were favoured by the Austro-German authorities. It is unnecessary to point out that no Ukrainian political idea influenced the creation of these organizations. The Germans selected their association, known under the name of '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*,[1]

[1] '*Khliborobiv*' means farmers in Ukrainian. '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*' means association of farmers.

[1] i.e. in 1919. --- Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

An important group of Ukrainian politicians, who had formerly supported Petlioura, joined the Bolshevik cause after his defeat. The Soviet Government inaugurated a policy of Ukrainization from the beginning in order to satisfy their ambitions and to show the world their nationalistic Liberalism. But, as under Petlioura, it was a superficial one and never penetrated in fact either into the private life of the citizens or into the sphere of education, or even into the administration.

Although Ukrainian had become the official language, nobody used it and correspondence between official institutions continued, with rare exceptions, in Russian. One of the authors of this book, who held an administrative post in a Soviet enterprise in the Ukraine from 1921 to 1924, had never written a single word in Ukrainian and had never been prosecuted for this defection. It is not because the word 'Odessa' is now written with one 's' instead of two and the word '*plochtchad*' (in Russian a town square) is to-day replaced by the word '*maidan*,' that the Ukraine has ceased to be Russia.

The policy of Ukrainization continued without great changes and in spite of the lack of common sense until 1927, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party suddenly decided to introduce the Russian language as the second official language. One can explain this sudden change by the development of separatist anti-Soviet propaganda, undertaken by secret organizations, formed under the protection of Poland. There occurred in the Ukraine the first wave of purification which was directed against the 'Nationalistic Chauvinists,' accused of spiritual connection with Galician 'counter-revolutionary' elements, which had been affected by the propaganda of Polish 'Fascists.'

The people's commissar for education of the Ukraine,

175 greatest Ukrainian poet), Mykola Kostomarov, historian, Panteleimon Kulish, historian and poet, Mykola Hulak, and others, took part in this organisation.

In the declarations of this society the idea of an independent Ukrainian democratic republic was promulgated: "And Ukraine will resurrect from her grave .... And Ukraine will be an independent republic" *(The Books of the Being of the Ukrainian Nation,* the work of the Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius).

The Russian Government punished the members of this society severely and acted rigorously against Ukrainian political and cultural regeneration.

• [191] In 1863 the Russian Minister Valuyev declared that "the Ukrainian language did not exist, does not exist and cannot exist." In 1876, by a secret order of the Tsar, the printing and circulation of Ukrainian books, periodicals etc. in the Russian Empire was prohibited. Even the Bible in Ukrainian was forbidden. Ukrainian could not be tought in schools. The Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire was forbidden until 1905. Only the revolution of 1917 made the introduction of Ukrainian in schools possible. This prohibition of the living language of a considerable nation, the instrument of its culture, had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people and is a feature absolutely unique in universal history.

[87] The prohibition of the Ukrainian language in the schools and in 175 the press hindered the development of education in Ukraine. The 517 statistics show that the number of schools and the level of education in Ukraine were higher in the 18th century than in the 19th*). On the other hand, the Russian schools separated the educated classes of the Ukrainian nation from their nationality, and put the intelligentsia of Ukrainian origin into the service of Russian culture. Thus, besides the economic exploitation to the advantage of the Russian Empire, Ukraine was deprived of her best intellectual forces which were drowned in the 'Russian Sea'. We can quote here only some names of prominent Ukrainians who, by virtue of circumstances, helped to create the Russian civilisation, and gave their talents for the increase of the Russian Empire: Archbishop Theophan Prokopovych, the deputy of the Patriarch of Moscow Stephan Javorsky, Bishop Dmytro Rostovsky — were prominent Ukrainian scholars of the time of Tsar Peter I. who were forced

*) Thus there were in 1748 in four regiments (Ukraine had a military Cossack administration) of the Hetmanate (for three regiments the figures are missing) 866 elementary schools, i. e., one school for 1000 inhabitants. From this, little or almost nothing remained in the 19th century.

nian Communists who wished to create an independent Soviet Ukraine participated in these uprisings. The policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine had a clearly predatory character. The Communist Commissar Schlichter said of the tasks of the Soviet Russian campaign at a session of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919:

"You all remember that when Ukraine was becoming Soviet with every day of the advance of the Red Army we became easier in our minds; the rich-in-bread Ukraine is ours! . . . We have four central supply detachments. We set all hopes on them. We have a lot of workers we have sent out who will be able to overflow all Ukrainian villages. We shall always remember that the looks of the proletariat of Russia are turned towards Ukraine" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 2: Kharkov, 1928).

Not only by the ruthless pillage were the Ukrainian people put against the Russian Communist dictatorship; by its nationalist policy, too, it roused great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians. The Rumanian Communist Rakovsky, who was appointed by Moscow as Premier of the Soviet Government of Ukraine, declared that the Ukrainian language and culture were 'petty bourgeois' and that the use of the Ukrainian language in public institutions was necessary only for 'Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries'.

For this reason the 'dictatorship of the Russian culture' was introduced in Ukraine by the Russian Communists as a 'proletarian' one. "The Soviet Government in Ukraine in 1918 made in fact Russian the official language", — writes the Communist N. Popov in his *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine* (1929). Against the declarations of an 'independent Soviet Ukraine', the Rakovsky Government proclaimed the 'federation' of Ukraine with Russia. There could not be free elections to the Soviets in Ukraine. The power in the villages was given to the 'Comittees of Poor Peasants' consisting often of people sent from Russia. According to the instruction these Comittees were given they had the duty — "to fulfil precisely and relentlessly all orders of the supply authorities . . ."

13. Risings in Ukraine

In spring 1919, when the Soviet Army had reached the Dniester River, Moscow prepared its forces for the support of Soviet Hungary. But at that time the same troops who had fought against the Franco-Greek forces under the command of Hrihoriev, Tyutyunnyk and others, started the fight against the Russian Communists. Of the strength of this movement Rakovsky, Premier of

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
656 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the
[423] Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist
[191] dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Co[illegible]ress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

though this population had accepted in a friendly manner the Soviet rule, hoping for an improvement of their situation. When Rumania in alliance with Germany joined the war against USSR in 1941, the Rumanian authorities on their part terrorised the Ukrainian population of Bukovina and Bessarabia. At the end of the war Bukovina and Bessarabia were joined with USSR again. The Communist terror turned with even greater vehemence against the Ukrainians there. Especially from Bukovina a great part of the Ukrainian population had been deported into the Eastern regions of the USSR. The cities were filled with foreign elements, colonists from Russia were brought into the villages.

3. The Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine)

After 1919 Carpatho-Ukraine, which had been for centuries under Hungarian rule, was attached to Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian population of this country consists mostly of peasants. The towns had a Jewish and Hungarian population. The Czech authorities in Carpatho-Ukraine (official name Carpatho-Ruthenia) favoured for some time the development of Ukrainian schools. But from 1925 the Prague Government began to support the Russophile group that despised the Ukrainian language as 'peasant' and used a strange mixture of the Church-Slavonic, Ukrainian, and Russian languages. In reality, these 'Russophiles' were adherents of Hungary and received support from Budapest too. The entire administration in Carpatho-Ukraine came into the hands of the Czech bureaucracy. According to the Treaty of Saint Germain, Carpatho-Ukraine was guaranteed autonomy inside the boundaries of CSR, but the Czechoslovakian Government permanently deferred its realisation.

At the end of 1938 Germany launched strong pressure against Czechoslovakia exploiting the national problem of this country, (Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians). The Prague Government changed the centralistic Constitution to a federative one. For the Carpathian Ukraine the Prague Government recognised an autonomous statute with a separate Diet and Government. Against this the neighbour states — Hungary and Poland — reacted vehemently. In February 1939, the elections to the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine took place. After the separation of Slovakia from Bohemia the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed the independence of this country (March 16, 1939). But with Hitler's and Mussolini's consent the Hungarian troops occupied Carpatho-Ukraine after stubborn fighting against the Ukrainian volunteers.

which was led by General Kornilov, later by Denikin. In the summer of 1918 the Kuban Region fell into the hands of the Russian Volunteer Army. The leaders of this army wished to make the Kuban Region a base for the restoration of Tsarist Russia. Among the population of the Kuban Region and in the State Council a strong opposition to the Russian Volunteers arose. But Russian influence was stronger. Under the pressure of Denikin's army an alliance of the Cossack territories — the Don, Kuban and Terek regions — for the fight against the Russian Communists was formed at the end of 1918. Against those Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks who defended their independence the Russian Volunteers used terroristic methods: President of the Kuban State Council Mykola Ryabovol was murdered in June 1919 in Rostov, prominent members of the State Council were arrested and hanged. This terror by the Russian 'Whites' was the reason that the Kuban Cossacks left the front against the Russian Red Army and repealed the alliance with the Russian Volunteers. At the beginning of 1920 the Kuban State Council according to the will of the population took the Government of the Kuban into its hands. Vasyl Ivanys was appointed Premier. The Kuban leaders wished to get rid of the protectorate of the Russian Volunteers and to continue the struggle against the Soviet Russian Army in alliance with Ukraine and the peoples of the Caucasus. But in April 1920, under pressure of the Soviet Russian Army, the Kuban Government was forced to leave its territory and to move to Crimea, where at that time the Volunteers' Army of General Wrangel was. Being pressed between two forces, both of which fought for domination in Russia, the 'Red' and the 'White' Russians, the Ukrainian Kuban Government could not attain any agreement with them and went abroad.

The Kuban Region was occupied by the Russian Red Army. Soviet Russia refused recognition of the Ukrainian nationality in the Kuban Region for a long time, and carried on a Russification line through the school and press. Only on August 30, 1929, the Commissariat of Education in Moscow decided that the literary language of the Ukrainians inside the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Republic was the language of Ukraine.

But even after this the Russian Communist bureaucracy hindered the development of schools among the Ukrainians in the RSFSR. In December 1933, in the Kuban Region and on other territories of the RSFSR, with a Ukrainian population of 7 millions, all Ukrainian schools, press etc. were abolished by order from Moscow. During the collectivisation and the famine of 1932—33 the population of the Kuban Region had enormous losses. Attempts on a rising

661 were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.

6. The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East

167 The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

668 Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrai-
186 nians, mostly farmers, were numbered. At that time a Ukrainian national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops, theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revolution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national, political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrainian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy. The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the develop-
656 ment of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the
191 development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrainians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow*, 1931, p. 33).

7. The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars

167 In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

Ukrainian problem has remained from old times for Soviet Russia the basic problem of its internal and foreign policy. The unceasing Russification policy against the Ukrainians is carried on by particularly cunning methods: the Ukrainian language is not yet abolished definitely in the offices of Soviet Ukraine. But that official who speaks Ukrainian also in his family and in private relations becomes in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suspicious, and has to suffer repressions.

The Communist theory of the national problem worked out by Lenin preaches the 'fusion of nations'. Basing on this, the Russian Communist Government is trying to 'fuse' the nations of the Soviet Union with the Russians. Against peoples who oppose forced Russification, ruthless repressions are used by Moscow. Even the mentioning of the national rights of the non-Russian peoples is condemned in the USSR as 'bourgeois nationalism'.

There is a great principal difference between the situation of the Russians and the peoples united by force with this state: though the Russians are not satisfied with the Communist dictatorship, they do not, however, feel national oppression. Even in the new anthem of the USSR it is said that this state was rallied by Great Russia. We can state the efforts of Russian political groups opposing the Communist régime to maintain the rule of the Russian state over the territories conquered by Soviet Russia, even after the eventual fall of the Soviet régime.

As a curious fact we can quote the view of the well-known Communist L. Trotzky, who was assassinated in Mexico during World War II, on the Ukrainian problem. Trotzky demanded in 1939 the full separation of Ukraine from Russia. But Trotzky thought of an independent Ukraine in the form of a Soviet Republic. This naturally deprived his thesis of all seriousness, for Trotzky needed the slogan of an independent Ukraine only as a political argument in polemics against Stalin (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 77/78, 1939).

As the facts prove, the Ukrainian nation has to endure the heaviest oppression in the USSR. Unfortunately, the words of the famous historian of France Charles Seignobos written in 1913 on Ukraine, can be used emphatically to describe the outstanding feature of the present state of the Ukrainian nation: "Here is the most oppressed nation" ("Voici la nation la plus opprimée", *Les Annales des Nationalités:* Paris, 1913).

In its equalising policy, the Soviet Russian Government retains, also, traces of the Tsarist régime in the affairs of Church and religion. Thus, after having seized Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine dur-

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1
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LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE[1]

By HAROLD R. WEINSTEIN

000 ONE of the most painful lessons mankind has learned since the rise of nationalism in the last hundred years is that language diversity fosters conflicts between states and among peoples living within one state but speaking different languages. Conversely, language uniformity makes for unity. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries most governments have strongly desired such uniformity. In some countries, as in America, assimilation into one language has been achieved by allowing national groups the free use of their native languages, and by relying upon the advance of education and of commercial and industrial development to break down the barriers those languages erect between various linguistic groups. In the period before the First World War, many governments sought language uniformity by forcibly repressing the languages of minorities, by Germanizing, Magyarizing, Russifying their national minority groups. Of no government was this more true than of that of the old Russian Empire, in which the "minorities" — that is, the groups other than the Great-Russians — constituted over half the population. But by attempting to suppress the languages of the Ukrainians, Georgians, Tatars and so on, the Tsarist régime did not achieve its goal of unity; rather, it aroused a host of nationalist movements which put language repression first on the bill of grievances against the government and which helped drive Tsarism to its death.

Lenin believed that the Tsarist method defeated its own ends and that the goal of unity had to be approached by other paths. First of all, literacy would have to precede any attempt to obtain language uniformity: as long as none other than oral means of communication existed between the minorities and the Russians, the Russian language could not really permeate the minorities and break down their national horizons. Literacy, of course, could be most easily reached by universal education in the minority languages themselves. Then, once the art of reading was mastered and great cultural vistas were opened to the minorities, they would be in a position to go ahead and adopt Russian as a second language. The Russian language would appeal to them because it is the language of a stronger culture than

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those the minorities possessed; and the necessity for knowing Russian would be heightened by drawing the minorities into the industrial, commercial and political life of the country as a whole. Meanwhile, literacy in the minority languages would facilitate the spread of communist doctrines stressing the international solidarity of the working-class against capitalism. To achieve unity while allowing the free use of minority languages might be the long — and perhaps very dangerous — way around, but Lenin believed it would be the only effective way in a backward, heterogeneous country like Russia.

The Soviet leaders were so certain that eventual lingustic uniformity could be attained only through temporary diversity that they went further in emphasizing minority languages than any state has ever gone: they made vigorous attempts to foster the actual use of the minority languages, to "nationalize" (i.e., "Ukrainize," "Armenianize," "Tartarize") political organizations, administrative apparatus, factory managements, trade-unions, military units, newspapers, books, theatres and schools, among the minorities. In their desire to retreat from the old Imperial policy of Russification, they leaned over so far backward that they introduced the element of compulsion in the opposite direction: they forced the national minorities and the Russians living among them to use the local languages in political, economic and cultural life, stopping short only at the threshold of the individual's private world. The ultimate effect of this policy upon the increase or decrease of nationalism among the minorities is not yet apparent, and the fate of such nationalism may hinge upon such factors as economic prosperity, political liberty and developments in the field of international relations; but the process of nationalizing the political, economic and cultural life of the minorities is an experiment which deserves more attention from the non-Soviet political and scholarly world than it has received.

In the field of education, the Soviet régime has followed a four-fold policy: first to establish a school system embracing all children; secondly, to promote the spread of communist doctrines by integrating them into the curriculum; thirdly, to nationalize the school system by introducing the languages of the minorities as the languages of instruction in schools attended by children of the minorities; and, fourthly, to pave the way for eventual assimilation by providing for the study of Russian as a separate subject in the schools of the minorities. The first two aspects of this policy are complex subjects, each of which deserves a separate study. The present discussion will therefore treat only of the linguistic phases of the Soviet educational policy: the nationalization of education — that is, the use of minority

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languages as the media of instruction; and the study of Russian as a separate subject.

In setting out to nationalize education, the Soviet régime has encountered many obstacles: Russian nationalists — and there were some even among the Communists — opposed the policy; text-books and teachers were scarce; and the more backward minorities did not even possess a written language of their own. As the exigencies of space prevent the investigation of all the problems encountered in the nationalization of education, this study will be limited to examining the policy as applied in the Ukraine; that is, to the Ukrainians and to the other minorities — Poles, Jews, Germans and others — living among them. The Ukrainians, it may be noted, are the largest minority in the Soviet Union; they are the most significant from the point of view of current international relations; and the difficulties encountered by the nationalization policy in the Ukraine were sufficiently complex to provide some insight into the policy as a whole.

Among the Ukrainians, as among the other minorities, the nationalization of education has stemmed from the program on the national question which Lenin formulated before the overthrow of the Tsarist régime. This program, intended to overcome minority nationalism, had to assign a conspicuous place to the language question. To many Ukrainians the treatment of their language by the Imperial government appeared even more onerous than the political oppression which was meted out to Russians and Ukrainians alike. The Ukrainian language was regarded by the government as an uncouth dialect of the Russian language; it was harried from the schools; and it was badgered throughout the literary, scholarly and theatrical worlds. The resulting Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin believed, was a threat to the international unity of the Ukrainian and Russian masses, a unity he regarded as essential for the achievement of socialism; and this Ukrainian nationalism would have to be met with the promise of linguistic equality for the Ukrainians and for all other nationalities. This conception was written into the program on the national question adopted by the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party in 1913, a program which was first intended to apply to a period of "capitalist democracy" but was retained after the establishment of the Soviet government in 1917. The first point in the program stated: "Insofar as national peace is possible in a capitalist society, which is based on exploitation, profits and wrangling, such peace is obtainable only by means of a thoroughly, consistently democratic, republican governmental structure, guaranteeing complete equality to all nations and languages, and by the inclusion in the con-

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stitution of a basic law nullifying every kind of privilege of one nation and every kind of violation of the right of the national minorities."[2]

While defending this point in the program, Lenin explained that he did not desire to turn Russia into a "Babelesque confusion" in which one national group could not communicate with another; and he thought that sooner or later the minorities of Russia would become assimilated, probably through adopting the Russian language he cherished so highly and which he expected would be taught as a subject in the schools.[3] However, Lenin argued, such assimilation could be achieved not by compulsion, not by the Tsarist method of repression, but by the natural process of commercial and industrial development and intercourse. To force the minorities to study the Russian language by "the use of the stick" merely estranged them and turned them against that language. If, on the other hand, the minorities were allowed to use their own language in education, they would willingly accept the study of Russian also and would, as in America, voluntarily use it because of its advantage in economic intercourse. Hence, wherever minorities lived compactly, their languages would be used as the medium of instruction in the schools; and where members of minorities were isolated among other nationalities, they would be given the opportunity to study the language of their nationality.

Although the Provisional Government, ushered in by the February Revolution in 1917, intended to alter the policy of Russification and proclaimed linguistic freedom for the minorities, it did not succeed in overcoming the hostility of the minority nationalists who were then rapidly extending their influence among the peasantry. The Provisional Government, for example, wrangled with the Ukrainian nationalists not only on the question of political autonomy, but also on the expediency of Ukrainizing some of the army units; and in the Ukraine itself the former Tsarist officials remaining at their posts obstructed the Ukrainization of the school system. As the discontent of the peasantry with the land policy of the Provisional Government fed the flames of Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin was more than ever resolved to overcome minority hostility by, among other things, establishing linguistic equality.

After the October Revolution had put the Bolsheviks in control, the Soviet régime introduced into the schools the policy of national

[2] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach i Rešenijach S'ezdov, Konferencii i Plenumov Ts.K., 1898–1932* (Moscow, 1933), I, 238–240.

[3] For the views of Lenin contained in this paragraph, see Lenin, V. I., *Sočinenija* (Moscow, 1935), XVI, pp. 509, 551–554, 595–596; XVII, pp. 66, 89, 114–115, 133, 139–154, 178–181, 361.

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languages as the medium of instruction. Lenin stigmatized as "Great-Russian Chauvinists," those people in the Commissariat of Education who favored teaching only in the Russian language; and referring specifically to the Ukrainians in a resolution he wrote for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, he stated that if the Bolsheviks wanted to overcome the hostility of the Ukrainian peasants (a hostility quite clearly evident during the Civil War from 1918 to 1920), the Ukrainian language could not be pushed into the background of either educational or political life.[4] Stalin argued that education in the minority languages would facilitate the raising of the cultural level of the minorities to that of the Russians and would thereby forge bonds of union between them.[5] The educational policy for the minorities, he stated, must have it as its aim: "to develop national culture; to build up a wide network of courses and schools for both general education and vocational and technical training, teaching in the native languages, for the purpose of training Soviet, party, trade-union and economic cadres from among the native people."[6] These views of Lenin and Stalin were incorporated into party resolutions, adopted in the decade after 1919, on education and on national policy generally.[7]

It was, of course, much easier to make speeches and pass resolutions than to realize the aims set forth therein. Even in the relatively advanced Ukraine it promised to be very difficult to establish a "wide network" of schools giving instruction in the national languages. The heritage of buildings, school supplies and qualified teachers bequeathed by Tsarism was meager in comparison with the needs of a régime aspiring to universal education: in the Kiev Educational District, for example, only twenty-two of every thousand people attended school in 1913.[8] Educational facilities, moreover, were reduced by the disastrous Civil War, during which constant fighting, famine, typhus, cholera, economic collapse and bankruptcy levied a high tax on the educational system; and the lack of funds and personnel long hampered its recuperation.[9] By 1924 the system approached its status

[4] *Ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 155, 552–554.

[5] J. Stalin, *Stati i Reči ob Ukraine* (Kiev, 1936), pp. 111–112, 194–195.

[6] J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (New York, 1935), p. 208.

[7] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach . . .* I, pp. 155, 637.

[8] The Kiev Educational District comprised the provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Podolia, Volhynia and Chernigov. The number of pupils is from Ministerstvo Narodnogo Prosvieshcheniia, *Vsepodanneišiі Otčet, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1915), p. 196. The estimate of the population is from Centralny Statističeski Komitet, *Ežegodnik Rossii, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 33–59.

[9] For the condition of the educational system up to 1924, see *Urkainska Socialistična Radianska Respublika. Zbirnik Spravozdan Narodnich Komisarijativ i centralnich ustanov U.S.R.R. ta Upolnivaženich Narodnich Komisarijativ R.S.F.S.R. 5-mu Vseukrainskomu Z'izdovi Rad Ukraini. Otčet Narodnogo Komisariati Oswiti U.S.R.R. za 1920 rik (Kharkov,*

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under Tsarism, but a long road had to be travelled before all children would have an opportunity to attend schools. Buildings would have to be constructed, teachers trained, text-books written and published. The Ukrainian government first endeavored to provide "elementary" or four-year schools for all children from eight to twelve years of age, then to expand these schools into "incomplete middle" or seven-year schools, and finally to replace these with "complete middle" or ten-year schools; and, in the meanwhile, the government established technical schools and higher educational institutions to train engineers, doctors, actors and other types of "socialist cadres." This quantitative growth of the school system was matched by its growth qualitatively, as measured from the point of view of the language policy. In spite of the shortages of teachers knowing Ukrainian and the languages of the other minorities,[2] the almost complete absence of text-books in these languages, and the appearance of considerable opposition on the part of political leaders, of teachers and even of parents, the Russian language was gradually replaced as the medium of instruction by the other languages.

As early as March 1919 an order of the Commissariat of Education of the newly re-established Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic declared that the Russification policy was abrogated; that the Commissariat would aid in the development of the long-repressed Ukrainian language; and that "in view of the elimination of a governmental language as such, and of the declaration that all local languages are equal, the Commissariat of Education gives the local population the right to determine in which language teaching must be carried on in the schools, safeguarding simultaneously the interests of [other] national groups."[10] Wherever the language of instruction remained Russian, a second language — also chosen by the local population itself — was to be taught as a special subject. In September 1920 this provisional order was strengthened by a law of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. The law instructed the Commissariat of Education to draw up a plan for schools of all grades and categories with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.[11] Ukrainian was to be studied as an obligatory subject in all teacher-training institutions and was to be used as the language of instruction in some of them. The law also ordered the Government Publishing House to issue "a sufficient quantity of text-books as well as *belles-lettres* and other publications in the Ukrainian language."

1921), pp. 3–6; *Zbirnik Uzakonen ta Rosporiadžen Robitničo-Seljanskogo Urjady Ukraini za 1924 rik*, 1924, part 1, sec. 271, pp. 800–803; Sojuz Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R., *Pjatyisesojuznyi S'ezd Sojuza Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R. Stenografičeski Otčet* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 172–174. [10] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1919, sec. 260, p. 347.

[11] *Ibid.*, 1920, part 1, sec. 509, pp. 712–713.

[2] [Prior to 1924 -- Analyst]

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During 1923 and 1924 several laws designed to provide elementary education for all children specified that this education was to be conducted in Ukrainian where that nationality predominated, and in the languages of the "national minorities" (minorities within the Ukrainian nationality — Poles, Germans, Jews, Czechs and so forth) wherever these minorities formed compact groups.[12] The laws outlined a series of practical measures to make this rule effective: teachers knowing Ukrainian were to be assigned to schools in which they were needed; text-books and other reading materials in Ukrainian were to be increased; pedagogical schools and courses were to be transferred to Ukrainian; pedagogical journals were to be Ukrainized; and all classes for teaching illiterates and semi-literates, except those for the non-Ukrainian minorities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian. Provision was also made for the obligatory study of Ukrainian as a separate subject in all schools being conducted in other languages.

These laws gave impetus to the process of Ukrainizing the "general" (elementary, incomplete middle and middle) schools; and the process was aided by the presence of many nationalists who had formerly opposed the Soviet régime but who had been pardoned and put to work in the Commissariat of Education. In 1923, according to a newspaper report, 47 percent of the general schools had been Ukrainized, while plans had been made to provide the Ukrainian pupils with Ukrainian schools by 1925.[13] During the years from 1923 to 1925 the realization of these plans was proceeding most effectively in the rural areas, where the largest proportion of the Ukrainian population was to be found. In the province of Kharkov, for example, 20 percent of the general schools in the school year 1923–24 were still using Russian and 49 percent were "mixed schools" — schools using Russian in some classes and Ukrainian in others; but 69 percent of the schools in the city of Kharkov were still using Russian exclusively.[14] A picture of the manifold difficulties encountered in this transitional period was presented by the district of Krolevetski in the province of Chernigov.[15] In 1924 instruction in the elementary schools was supposed to be given in Ukrainian; but a majority of the teachers hardly knew the language, and they actually used a jumble of Ukrainian and Russian. In the middle schools the situation was worse: a majority of the teachers not only did not know Ukrainian, but considered themselves exempt from learning it because they had been former

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[12] *Ibid.*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–899; 1924, part 1, sec. 272, p. 801; 1924, part 1, sec. 300, pp. 932–933.

[13] *Visti* (organ of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Executive Committee), Oct. 28, 1923.

[14] *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1923; see also *ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1924. [15] *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1924.

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teachers in the gymnasium and therefore possessed "higher qualifications"; and these teachers showed "active or passive resistance" to Ukrainization. In this district, as in many others, the complaint was made that the schools lacked Ukrainian text-books and other such reading materials.[16]

These difficulties were gradually being overcome. By 1924 the publication of text-books and children's literature in Russian had almost ceased in the Ukraine, and the publishing houses were concentrating on Ukrainian materials.[17] Ukrainian was being taught in all pedagogical schools and teacher-training courses.[18] The results of this step were apparent in 1925. In Chernigov province, for example, 67 percent of the teachers had mastered Ukrainian, and the proportion of Ukrainian schools — which then stood at 54 percent — was being raised as rapidly as the teachers who had recently learned Ukrainian could be transferred to the districts where they were needed.[19]

During 1925 and 1926 the whole process of Ukrainization was raised to the status of a "high-pressure (*udarnaja*) campaign. "Attention was directed even to the *crèches* because, as one writer explained, the early years of a child's life are of the utmost significance in his linguistic development.[20] But a report from Chernigov in 1926 stated that the teachers were agitating among the peasantry against the Ukrainization of the schools; they were "striving with all their forces to discredit the Ukrainian language, to arouse the peasants to adopt resolutions against Ukrainizing the schools, and so on."[21] This was denied by the school officials in the region from which the report emanated,[22] but similar items of news came from other regions. One writer cited a specific teacher in the Don Basin: although she was supposed to teach the Ukrainian language as a separate subject, she could hardly speak it and she referred to it as "a terribly ugly and crude language."[23] Another reporter, again from Chernigov, produced evidence to illustrate the hostility of both parents and teachers: because of this hostility a region with an overwhelmingly Ukrainian population contained thirty-five Russian schools, one Ukrainian and one mixed school.[24]

[16] See *ibid.*, Mar. 4, 1924, Mar. 5, 1924.
[17] *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1924. [18] *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1923.
[19] *Kommunist* (organ of the Central Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine), Mar. 21, 1925.
[20] *Proletarska Pravda* (organ of the Kiev Regional Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, of the Kiev Regional Executive Committee and of the Kiev Regional Trade-Union Council), Aug. 26, 1926.
[21] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926. [22] *Ibid.*, July 25, 1926.
[23] *Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1926. [24] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926.

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However, the Ukrainization of education slowly approached its goal. It is impossible to determine the actual number of Ukrainian children studying in Ukrainian schools, for the school statistics contained only the total number of children studying in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish and other schools; and while some Ukrainian children studied in non-Ukrainian schools, many non-Ukrainian children studied in Ukrainian schools. However, an approximate idea of the extent of Ukrainization can be gained by comparing the proportion of school children in Ukrainian schools with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. According to the school census of December, 1927, ten years after the Bolshevik Revolution, 75.8 percent of all pupils in elementary schools were in schools conducted entirely in Ukrainian; 6.9 percent were in schools in which some classes were conducted in Ukrainian and some in other languages; and 10.6 per cent were in Russian schools.[25] As the Ukrainians in 1927 were estimated at 80.1 percent of the total population and the Russians at 9.2 percent, the elementary schools might be considered to be nearing the goal of Ukrainization. The seven-year schools, then the predominant type of middle schools, lagged behind the elementary schools because they were relatively more numerous in the Russianized cities; of the pupils in these schools, 60.7 per cent were in Ukrainian schools, 14.7 percent in mixed schools and 15.5 per cent in Russian schools.

In some places, particularly in some cities, the Ukrainization policy overshot its mark. Whereas the Ukrainian population of Kiev was estimated at 41.1 percent of the total population in 1927, 49.8 percent of its school children were attending Ukrainian schools, 5.9 percent mixed schools and 30.6 percent Russian schools.[26] The proportion of pupils in Ukrainian schools was also greater than the proportion of the Ukrainian population in Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk. This situation, as shall be noted below, was regarded unfavorably by some writers in the newspapers, but the charges of "over-Ukrainization" received little attention from the government until after 1933. During the period from 1923 to 1933 the government was concentrating its efforts upon suppressing Russian nationalism and upon providing the Ukrainian and other non-Russian nationalities with schools conducted in their own languages.

In this period much attention was also given to the Ukrainization of technical and higher educational institutions, but in these institutions the lack of teachers knowing Ukrainian, of text-books and of good-will was an even greater handicap than in the Ukrainization of

[25] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini na 15 Grudnja 1927 (Peperedni Pidsumki Skilnogo Perepisy)*, Kharkov, 1928, pp. 20–21. [26] *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

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the general schools. As early as 1923 the government ordered the gradual Ukrainization of various technical schools ("technicums," "workers' faculties," etc.) and of higher educational institutions (medical, art, pedagogical, engineering and other "institutes").[27] Vacancies in their teaching and administrative staffs were to be filled preferably with people knowing Ukrainian; some courses were to be conducted in Ukrainian immediately; all students were obliged to study Ukrainian history, literature, economic geography and language; Ukrainian dictionaries and lists of Ukrainian equivalents for Russian scientific terms were to be issued in order to hasten Ukrainization. After the promulgation of this law the process of Ukrainizing technical and higher educational institutions proceeded under the constant prodding of the Commissariat of Education;[28] but by the summer of 1926 only a small proportion of these schools were considered fully Ukrainized, the chief obstacle being that the faculties did not know Ukrainian: in Odessa and Kharkov, for example, only six percent of the professors in the higher educational institutions had mastered that language.[29] At this time the Central Committee of the Party stepped into the picture and ordered an intensification of efforts to Ukrainize these institutions.[30]

A lively flurry of activity to bring the technical and higher schools into line followed the Central Committee's directive, which was passed along by the local committees.[31] The Commissariat of Education ordered the Ukrainization of all technical schools, except those serving national minorities, by the beginning of the school year 1927–28.[32] The Scientific-Pedagogical Society of the Ukrainian Academy of Science held a series of conferences to improve the teaching of the Ukrainian language, literature and history; to work out and distribute lists of Ukrainian scientific terms; and to establish Ukrainization courses for faculty members.[33] Finally, the Ukrainian government took a long step toward the Ukrainization of these schools when its basic statute on education, adopted in 1927, formulated a series of definite rules pertaining to technical and higher schools.[34] All students entering these institutions were to be examined in their knowledge, unless they had graduated from Ukrainian middle schools. Professors, other teachers and scientific workers were to possess a knowledge of Ukrainian equivalent to that demanded of government officials, and

[27] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–897.
[28] E.g. *Kommunist*, Mar. 6, 1925; Mar. 20, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, July 6, 1926.
[29] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 6, 1926. [30] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1926.
[31] This was done, for example, by the Kiev Regional Committee of the Party.—*Ibid.*, July 15, 1926. [32] *Ibid.*, July 14, 1926. [33] *Ibid.*, July 4, 1926, July 22, 1926.
[34] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1927, part 1, sec. 157, pp. 626–628.

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no professor or other teacher could be appointed unless he could conduct his courses in Ukrainian.[35] Institutions for scientific research and for preparing research workers, including the universities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian; and candidates for degrees in such institutions were not to be accepted until they had passed an examination in that language.

Progress in Ukrainizing the technical and higher educational institutions was indicated by the school census of 1927. The Ukrainian language was used for instruction in educational establishments embracing 14.2 percent of the students in the higher institutes, 33.7 percent of the students in the technicums and 47.4 percent of those in other types of technical schools.[36] Although the actually Ukrainized institutes and technicums were not numerous, many of the others were then undergoing Ukrainization. Establishments using both Ukrainian and Russian contained 74.8 percent of the students in the institutes, 43.7 percent of those in the technicums and 33.3 percent of those in other types of technical schools. Only 7.1 percent of the students in the institutes, 17.7 percent of those in the technicums and 13.7 percent in other technical schools still studied exclusively in Russian.[37]

After 1927 the process of Ukrainization proceeded steadily, but in 1929 the Party and the government still regarded the condition of the higher and technical schools pessimistically. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, stated that a considerable part of the teachers and professors in these institutions were hostile to Ukrainization;[38] and newspaper reports bore him out. In Odessa, for example, Professors Tolstoi and Demetz refused to teach in Ukrainian and considered that all lecturers who did so were "renegades."[39] In 1929 the Commissariat of Education was forced to rule that all students intending to graduate from higher educational institutions would first have to pass an examination in the Ukrainian language equivalent to that demanded of government officials.[40]

[35] Only students and professors coming to the Ukraine from other republics were to be permitted additional time to fulfill the requirements.

[36] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 48–51. In this period technicums were classified with higher educational institutions rather than with other types of technical or "professional" schools, which were in turn classified as middle schools. The other technical schools included "workers' faculties," "workers' evening professional schools," "schools of the working youth," "long-term courses," "schools of brigade apprenticeship," and "trade-union schools."

[37] This data was given in a speech by Kossior, published in *Proletari* (organ of the central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine and of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade-Unions), July 17, 1930. [38] *Ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1929.

[39] *Komsomolec Ukraini* (organ of the Central Committee of the Leninist Communist Union of the Youth of the Ukraine), Mar. 16, 1929. [40] *Proletari*, Apr. 25, 1919.

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At this time, when the whole problem of Ukrainizing the highly Russianized Don Basin and other industrial regions in the Ukraine was being attacked, the failure to Ukrainize the school system was frequently mentioned.[41] Even a directive of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in January 1930, stated that in the industrial regions only the schools for general education and for extirpating illiteracy had been Ukrainized; and the directive ordered the Commissariat of Education to examine the faculty members of the technical and higher schools on their knowledge of Ukrainian, and to take steps to insure that these people possessed such a knowledge.[42]

During 1930 and 1931 the reports on the Ukrainization of technical and higher schools were limited largely to items of "self-criticism" which pointed out obstacles or found fault with specific institutions and individuals. The professors in the Medical Institute in Kharkov now knew Ukrainian, but the process of Ukrainization was being retarded by the lack of Ukrainian text-books.[43] In the Lisenko Theatrical Institute in Kiev the classes were conducted in Ukrainian, but the reporter complained that extra-class work was still being carried on in Russian.[44] An investigation of the Institute of Consumer Coöperation and of the Veterinary Institute revealed that the majority of the students still spoke Russian among themselves and that two professors of the former institution refused to instruct their classes in Ukrainian.[45] Both professors and students in the Construction Institute and the Chemical Institute were reported to be hostile to the use of Ukrainian: one of the professors had been discharged for this reason, and the students had declared Ukrainization to be proper only for the middle schools. Because the library lacked Ukrainian books and only three of the hundred and twenty-two journals received were in Ukrainian, the administration of the Chemical Institute was upbraided for opposition to Ukrainization.[46] The Textile and Mining Institutes were also cited as examples of the failure to Ukrainize properly.[47]

The years up to 1933 constituted the high-pressure period of Ukrainization; after 1933 the government concentrated its attention chiefly upon suppressing the tendency to "over-Ukrainize," where such a tendency was discernible, and upon rectifying the results of this tendency which had already appeared. This was not a new pol-

[41] E. g., *Komsomolec Ukraini*, May 16, 1929, June 26, 1929.
[42] *Proletari*, Jan. 3, 1930. [43] *Ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1930.
[44] *Proletarska Pravda*, Sept. 22, 1931. [45] *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1931.
[46] *Ibid.*, June 30, 1931. [47] *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1931.

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Chernigov the school assigned to the Jewish language — which in the Soviet Union means Yiddish rather than Hebrew — was using that language even before the schools for Ukrainian children were using Ukrainian.[54] A report from Kiev described a campaign undertaken to draw Polish students into the Polish Pedagogical Institute, into the Polish departments of the technical schools, and into other Polish educational units.[55] In the meanwhile, the Jewish Pedagogical Institute in Kiev was being moved into a new building provided by the Commissariat of Education, and elementary schools were being established for Czechs and Assyrians.[56] Dnepropetrovsk reported that its German school was being enlarged.[57] The city of Kharkov found it could not open a school for Koreans (!) because no teachers were available, and the Kharkov City Committee of the Party asked the Vladivostok City Committee and the Communist University of the Toiling East to supply a few Korean teachers.[58]

No evidence that Kharkov ever succeeded in opening a Korean school has come into the hands of the author; but in 1926 the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. complimented the Ukrainian Republic on its attention to the educational needs of the minorities; and the school statistics for 1927 indicated that a considerable number of children of the minorities were studying in their own languages. Of all the pupils in general (four and seven year) schools, 2.9 percent studied in Jewish schools; 1.4 percent in German schools; 0.9 percent in Polish schools and 0.8 percent in schools using other minority languages: Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Tartar, Swedish, Greek, Assyrian and Moldavian.[59] Schools using both Ukrainian or Russian and some other language or languages embraced 2.1 percent of all the pupils. Since Jews composed 5.4 percent of the total population, Poles 1.6 percent, Germans 1.4 percent and other minorities 2.1 percent, it is evident that many of the children of the smaller nationalities went to Ukrainian or Russian schools. This fact can probably be accounted for in part by the lack of buildings and teachers, by the scattered distribution of the smaller minorities and by the indifference of the smaller nationalities themselves. The Jews, for example, have tended to assimilate into the Russian nationality in the large cities and into the Ukrainian nationality in the smaller towns and villages. The younger generation of Jews favor Russian or Ukrainian as their social language, and many Jewish parents prefer to put their

[54] *Visti*, Oct. 2, 1924.
[55] *Ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1926.
[56] *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925.
[57] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 24, 1926.
[58] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1926.
[59] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–25.

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children into Russian or Ukrainian schools. One reporter in 1933 gave evidence to show that some Jewish parents had desired their children to attend non-Jewish schools, but that pressure had been brought to bear upon them by zealous officials to send their children to the Jewish schools newly constructed for them.[60]

As an illustration of the attitude of the children themselves, an experience of the author may be pertinent. Upon visiting a Jewish school in Kiev, he observed that some of the pupils were carrying Russian text-books; and to the enquiry as to whether no Yiddish books existed for those subjects, several pupils replied: "Oh, yes; but we like to read the Russian texts better than the Yiddish." The school happened to be located in the old Jewish section of Kiev, and undoubtedly the children were sent to this school either because they spoke Yiddish at home (but not amongst themselves) or because of the superior facilities offered by a new institution; and if they had been able to decide for themselves, it is possible that many of these children would have chosen to attend Russian or even Ukrainian schools. Russian is the language of a culture stronger than the secular non-Hebrew culture conveyed by the Yiddish language in the Soviet Union; Russian is also the language spoken in Moscow and generally throughout the U.S.S.R.; and all those pupils, and parents, too, who ever expect to move freely about the Union must have complete mastery of the Russian language. What is true of the Jews is also true of the Poles, Germans, Czechs and others.

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That the children of the minorities had to master the Russian and Ukrainian languages if they desired to continue their education on the higher levels is indicated by the nature of the technical and higher educational institutions in the Ukraine. It was impossible to set up an electrical engineering institute for a handful of Poles or Assyrians, or to establish every type of higher educational institution for the Jews. Hence, as the statistics for 1927 indicated, most of the technical and higher educational institutions taught in Ukrainian, Russian or a mixture of the two. Of the students in the lower technical schools (technical schools other than technicums) only 1.4 percent studied in Jewish schools, 0.1 percent in Polish schools, 0.3 percent in German schools, 0.1 percent in the schools of other minorities, and 3.0 percent studied in schools that had one or more of the minority languages together with either Russian or Ukrainian or both.[61] There were no institutes using exclusively the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian minority languages, although 3.9 percent of the students studied

[60] *Proletarska Pravda*, Mar. 29, 1933.

[61] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 48–51.

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in institutes that conducted part of their work in Russian or Ukrainian and part in other languages. Of the students in the technicums, 1.5 percent studied in technicums using the Jewish language, 0.5 percent in those using Polish, 0.7 percent in those using German, 0.5 per cent in those using other non-Russian minority languages, and 0.5 percent in technicums using Russian or Ukrainian and one or more of the other languages. These figures do not signify that the Jewish, Polish or German children were deprived of a chance to study in technical and higher schools; on the contrary, the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian student body in these establishments, as will be noted below, was relatively larger than the Ukrainian and Russian student body.

The work of establishing schools using the languages of the smaller nationalities continued after 1927; in fact, it was given additional impetus by the campaign of 1933–35 against nationalist influences in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education. But before examining the effects of this campaign, it is necessary to note the attitude toward Russian schools. At the core of the process of Ukrainization was the transformation of Russian into Ukrainian schools; and it was not surprising that there appeared in at least some areas a tendency to deprive the Russian-speaking population of an opportunity to study in Russian schools. This was, to be sure, not at all the intention of the government. In its decree in expanding general education, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee ordered that "special attention be directed toward assuring schools with instruction in the Russian language for all children of the Russian nationality."[62] But, as has been noted above, the proportion of pupils studying in Ukrainian schools in some places — especially in the larger cities — was greater than the proportion of Ukrainians in the population. A writer in *Proletarska Pravda* (*Proletarian Truth*) claimed in 1926 that the general schools in Kiev were being over-Ukrainized.[63] He was answered by another writer, who argued that whereas the criticism was based on an examination of the number of *schools*, there was still a larger proportion of *classes* being held in Russian than the proportion of Russians in the total population; and the second writer denounced the first for bringing grist to the mill of the enemies of the Soviet national policy.[64] The criticism was proven correct by the school statistics for 1927; but since the process of Ukrainization was in full swing and since at this time the Party considered the Russian nationalists

[62] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1926, part 1, sec. 453, p. 1246.
[63] *Proletarska Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1926. [64] *Ibid.*

in the Ukraine more dangerous than the Ukrainian variety, no additional attention was given to the problem of Russian children.

In 1933, however, the offensive against Ukrainian nationalism occasioned a review of the Ukrainization process. Ukrainian nationalism had been considered a dangerous force since 1926, when Shumskii and Khvilovoi — two important figures in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education — were censured for desiring "to orient Ukrainian culture on capitalist Europe rather than on socialist Moscow." The Party became still more alert to signs of nationalism after the uncovering in 1929 of the Society for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, a secret organization headed by such outstanding nationalists as Efremov, Germaize and Nikovskii. But it was the campaign against the collectivization of agriculture which occasioned the intensive campaign against the nationalists. The Party regarded the opposition to collectivization as the result in large part of the nationalists, and it set out to remove them from every branch of political, economic and cultural activity. The central figure in the campaign was Nicholas Skripnik, an "Old Bolshevik" who was accused of having fallen under the influence of his nationalist colleagues and was removed from his position as Commissar of Education in March 1933. Even before his removal, however, the Commissariat of Education and all of its activities were under fire.

Charges of over-Ukrainization of the school system were first launched in an editorial appearing in *Kommunist* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party) in February 1933, and reprinted in other newspapers. The editorial said: "The mistakes and perversions in realizing the Ukrainization of the schools led in a considerable number of places to neglecting and ignoring the interests of the national minorities and especially the needs and requirements of the Russian toiling masses living in the Ukraine. Among responsible circles of the Commissariat there was concocted the 'theory' that the majority of the children in the cities, small towns and other labor centers speak a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon, and that therefore the majority of these children should study in the Ukrainian language. As a result, a significant part of the Russian toiling masses were deprived of schools in their native language and actually subjected to the forced Ukrainization which the Party had condemned in all of its directives."[66] Shortly after this editorial appeared, an article in *Proletarska Pravda* stated that in Kiev only 49 percent of the Russian children and 30 percent of the Jewish children studied in schools conducted in their native languages; that although

[66] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1933.

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some of the others studied in mixed Ukrainian-Russian or Ukrainian-Jewish schools, they were "mechanically transferred" after the first four years to classes using Ukrainian.[66]

Zatonski, who replaced Skripnik as Commissar of Education, stated that the Ukrainization of Russian children had taken place in Kharkov and in the Don Basin as well as in Kiev; and he pointed to Krasnolutzki District, where the number of Russian schools had dropped from twenty in 1930 to twelve in 1932.[67] He also declared that in Kherson and Makiivitz there were no Russian elementary schools at all; and that in some places there had been a voluntary Ukrainization of Russian children because the buildings and equipment provided for the Russian schools were greatly inferior to those of the Ukrainian schools.[68] Additional evidence was forthcoming in 1934 and 1935 to show some enforced Ukrainization of Polish children and of those of other minorities, as well as of some of the Russian children; and this situation was denounced as an example of "deliberate nationalist wrecking."[69]

This campaign against over-Ukrainization, however, was not intended to lead to a revival of the Russification policy. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was adamant on this point. He explained in 1933 that the results of over-Ukrainization would have to be eliminated because this was demanded by internationalism, "by the brotherly interests of the toilers of all the nationalities in the Ukraine."[70] But, he went on, the Russian nationalists would not be allowed to take advantage of mistakes already committed in order to reverse the policy of Ukrainization; on the contrary, there would be a further drive for "Bolshevik Ukrainization." A similar view was taken in 1934 by Postishev, the assistant secretary of the Central Committee and the official most actively engaged in hunting down the Ukrainian nationalists.[71]

According to the latest available material, the Ukrainization of education has kept pace with the expansion of general education, and a greater proportion of pupils were studying in Ukrainian schools in 1937 than in 1927. By 1937 the general schools embraced 5,364,800 children as compared with 1,678,100 in 1913 — an increase of 319 percent over the pre-War year; and whereas twenty-two of every thousand people attended elementary school in the Kiev Educational District in 1912, in 1937 the figure for all of the Ukraine had risen to

[66] *Ibid.*, Mar. 29, 1933. [67] *Visti*, May 1, 1933. [68] *Ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1933.
[69] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1934 (speech of Zatonski); Aug. 22, 1934, Jan. 5, 1935.
[70] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1933. [71] *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1934.

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one hundred seventeen of every thousand people.[72] The middle schools had expanded greatly by 1937; the fifth to tenth grades embraced 1,927,100 pupils in 1937 as compared with 347,900 pupils in 1928, an increase of 554 percent in ten years.[73]

While the school system was expanding quantitatively, the number of children studying in Ukrainian schools was also increasing. During the school year 1935–36, the year that marked the end of the campaign to check over-Ukrainization, 83.0 percent of the pupils in the general schools were studying in the Ukrainian language. This percentage coincides roughly with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. It also represents a higher percentage of pupils in Ukrainian schools than attended such schools in 1927, a fact which resulted from the expansion of middle schools in the rural areas and from the decline in the number of children attending schools in some of the other languages. During the school year 1935–36, 12.7 percent of all the pupils in the general schools studied in Russian, 1.4 percent in Jewish, 1.3 percent in German, 0.5 percent in Moldavian and 0.5 percent in Polish schools.[74] In absolute numbers, there had been an increase between 1927 and 1935–36 in the pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Greek languages; there had been a decline in the number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Swedish and Assyrian languages; and schools had been established for Uzbeks, Belorussians, Kirghiz, Kazaks, Turkomens and Latvians.[75]

With regard to the technical and higher educational institutions, the author has no figures on the number of students in the Ukrainized

[72] The figure for the number of pupils in 1937 is taken from *Socizlističeskoe Stroitelstvo Sojuza S.S.S.R., 1933–1938* gg. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1939), p. 163.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[74] *Socialistična Ukraina. Statistični Zbirnik* (Kiev, 1937), p. 222.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 222. *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–26. A comparison of absolute figures for 1927 and 1935–36 must take into account that the statistics for 1927 gave the total number of pupils in mixed schools but not the number studying in various languages used in these schools. The number of pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Czech languages in 1935–36 was greater than the number studying in their own schools in 1927 plus the total number in mixed schools using these languages for some classes. The conclusion that there was a decline in the total number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Assyrian and Swedish languages is arrived at by considering roughly the number of pupils in mixed schools studying in these languages. For example, in 1927 there were 68,836 pupils in Jewish schools; in 1935–36 there were 69,211 pupils studying in the Jewish language; hence, there were 375 more pupils *studying in Jewish* in 1935–36 than had been *attending Jewish schools* in 1927. But in 1927 there were 11,603 pupils in mixed schools using Jewish and either Russian or Ukrainian; in all probability there were more than 375 pupils in these schools who were being taught in Jewish; and by 1935–36 the surplus above 375 had been lost to Jewish classes, indicating a decline in the total number studying in Jewish.

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schools for the years after 1927; and one might conclude from the lack of such figures in the important statistical collections that Ukrainization has ceased or has been reversed. However, this conclusion would not be consistent with the continued stress on the preparation of "Ukrainian cadres," which was the primary purpose of Ukrainizing these institutions. The need for Ukrainian engineers, agronomists, writers and scientific workers was emphasized both by Kossior and by the resolution of the Thirteenth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1937.[76] Kossior, moreover, stated that there had been a large increase in the number of Ukrainian professors, instructors, scientific workers and candidates for higher degrees. Finally, the number of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technical and higher schools had grown absolutely and relatively. Between 1927 and 1936 the total number of students in the technicums had increased from 29,300 to 133,300; in the workers' faculties, from 7,400 to 53,500; and in the institutes from 28,200 to 108,200.[77] The increase for the technicums was 455 percent, for the workers' faculties 722 percent and for the institutes 384 percent. In the meanwhile, the proportion of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technicums had risen from 58.0 to 75.3 percent; in the workers' faculties from 57.9 to 65.0 percent; and in the institutes from 48.8 to 53.7 percent.[78] The number of students from among the minorities had increased absolutely but had fallen relatively. Since the increasing proportion of the students were Ukrainians (probably chiefly graduates of Ukrainian general schools and therefore favorable to and easily adaptable to courses conducted in Ukrainian), and since the number of Ukrainian faculty members had risen, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the process of Ukrainizing the technical and higher institutions had continued even after the intensive campaign against the nationalists was undertaken in 1933.

As for the obligatory study of the Ukrainian language in the schools of the other nationalities — provided for in laws of 1920 and 1927[79] — no change has taken place. An order of the Commissariat of Education, issued in December 1940 and just received by the author, clearly indicates this fact. The order is designed to facilitate the study of Ukrainian by children who have come from other republics and, having entered non-Ukrainian schools, are handicapped in the study of

[76] *Visti*, May 30, 1937; June 6, 1937. [77] *Socialistična Ukraina* . . . , p. 133.

[78] The percentages for 1927 are taken from *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii (Bilšovikiv) Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–52. The percentages for 1936 are from *Socialistična Ukraina* . . . , p. 152.

[79] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1920, part 1, sec. 509, p. 713; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626.

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this subject.[80] Declaring that the mastering of Ukrainian is obligatory for these children as well as for all other pupils in non-Ukrainian schools, the order states that the younger ones shall be sent to lower grades to study Ukrainian; the older ones may continue along with their classmates, and are to be marked leniently in this subject; and all are to be given special assistance in their study of Ukrainian so that by the time they graduate they may be able to fulffill the requirements demanded of the other pupils. Hence, the campaign against nationalism has not altered this aspect of the Ukrainization policy.

Perhaps the most significant result of the campaign against the Ukrainian nationalists was the effort to point up the importance of the Russian language and the value of Russian culture for the Soviet Union's minorities. One aspect of this effort was the greater emphasis placed on the study of the Russian language in the non-Russian schools of the Ukraine. A thorough mastering of Russian, regarded as a "second" and not as a "foreign language," had long been intended by the Party leaders, and had been provided for in the legislation on education. The important law on the Ukrainization of education in 1923 stated that "because the Russian language has all-governmental and all-Union significance and because it joins the Ukrainian people to the culture of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," the study of Russian as an obligatory subject was to be retained in all Ukrainian schools.[81] In the schools of the non-Ukrainian minorities in the Ukraine, either Ukrainian or Russian was to be selected by the population as a subject for obligatory study. The basic statute on education issued in 1927 went still further: both the Ukrainian and the Russian languages were to be taught as obligatory subjects in *all* schools.[82] In explaining the purpose of this clause, Skripnik stated that "now — since the proletarian revolution — the Russian language, once a language of oppression, is the language in which are written the works of Lenin; now the Ukrainians regard it as a brotherly language containing great revolutionary compositions; and in order that after leaving school the Ukrainians may be able to make use of Russian culture, the Russian language is taught as an obligatory subject."[83] This statement, coming from the Commissar of Education, was of considerable importance; but it was later revealed that interest in the Russian language had been lost in the whirl of Ukrainization.

[80] *Zbirnik Nakaziv ta Rosporiadžen Narodnogo Komisariaty Osviti Ukrainskoi R.S.R.*, 1940, sec. 355, p. 14. [81] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, p. 900.
[82] *Ibid.*, 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626. [83] *Proletarska Pravda*, May 9, 1926.

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In 1933 Zatonski censured the nationalists in the Commissariat of Education for neglecting the teaching of Russian which, because it was the means of all-Union communication, "should be taught in all the Ukrainian schools and in the schools of other nationalities."[84] But the real interest in the teaching of Russian appeared in 1937 and 1938, when the Commissariat was again over-hauled. During these years there was another intensified drive against Ukrainian nationalism, as well as against other varieties of opposition to the Party's policies and against every manifestation of inefficiency. Even Zatonskii was removed from his post. And while the renewed attack on nationalism in general was proceeding, a large amount of criticism was directed against the Commissariat of Education for its neglect of the Russian language as a subject of study. The critics — one of whom was E. N. Postnikova, a teacher and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. — stated that because of "the wrecking activities of the bourgeois nationalists," there was a higher percentage of failures in the courses on Russian language and literature than in any other subject.[85] In the first place, not enough time was being allotted to the study of Russian. Secondly, there was a dearth of text-books and of Russian literature in the school libraries: even such works as Gorki's *Mother*, Tolstoi's *War and Peace*, Goncharov's *Oblomov* and the collected works of Lenin were to be found only in Ukrainian translations. Thirdly, the Commissariat had not devoted sufficient attention to methods of teaching Russian and had failed to provide methodological programs for the guidance of teachers. Finally, the knowledge of Russian possessed by the teachers themselves was entirely inadequate; even the graduates of the pedagogical institutes did not know the language well enough to teach it. Since, the critics argued, the pupils themselves were strongly inclined to study Russian, the Commissariat should provide more thorough preparation of teachers, assign more time for this subject, provide more text-books and more Russian literature.

As a result of these criticisms the re-organized Commissariat provided new programs, several of which are in the hands of the author, and it increased the time allotted to the study of Russian. The number of hours specified for the study of languages during the entire period of attendance in the various types of schools, according to the

[84] *Visti*, Aug. 23, 1933.

[85] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), May 16, 1937; *Učitelskaia Gazeta* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), Feb. 27, 1938, Mar. 19, 1938, Mar. 29, 1938.

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teaching plans for the school year 1939–40, is contained in the following table:[86]

I. Schools with Ukrainian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Ukrainian Language	1130 hours	1187 hours
Russian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Ukrainian Language	2068 hours	1994 hours
Russian Language	1131 hours	1221 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

II. Schools with Russian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Russian Language	1130 hours	1147 hours
Ukrainian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Russian Language	2150 hours	2111 hours
Ukrainian Language	955 hours	1022 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

III. Schools with Jewish or Moldavian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Jewish or Moldavian Language	993 hours	989 hours
Ukrainian Language	196 hours	252 hours
Russian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Jewish or Moldavian Language	1383 hours	1350 hours
Ukrainian Language	586 hours	618 hours
Russian Language	1131 hours	1221 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

[86] Narodni Kommissariat Osvita U.R.S.R., *Navčalni plani. počatkovoi ta serednoi školi* (Kiev, 1939) pp. 8–9, 11, 13, 15–17, 19, 21, 23. It may be noted that the plan for the rural elementary schools contained 36 more hours and for the rural middle schools 54 more hours than was assigned to the corresponding urban schools.

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In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both within and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.
[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . .* , 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

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185 517 191 369 in spite of efforts to produce films and to broadcast programs in the Ukrainian language — potent forces for assimilation to Russian culture. To the goal of assimilation, moreover, much is contributed by the industrialization of the Ukraine: new factories bring rural Ukrainians into the cities where Russian still predominates in social life, and the younger Ukrainians in the city easily adopt the prevailing language. But these forces for assimilation, even though coupled with the inculcation of communist doctrines through the media of education and culture, may be cancelled by a growth of nationalism; and such nationalism may thrive on the shocks of economic disorders and unsuccessful foreign war. The language policy itself promotes the process of assimilation by encouraging bi-lingualism; but by stressing the use of minority languages, it furthers at least a greater temporary diversification. The question of whether the forces of unity are now stronger or weaker than the forces of division can be answered only by the future.

WASHINGTON, D. C.